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ABSTRACT.  The difference of judicial opinion in the Supreme Court in Evans provokes reflection 
on fundamental constitutional principles, such as parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.   
A statute that on its face seems to permit a government minister to override a judicial decision of 
which he disapproves inevitably raises acute concern; the correct reading of the statute depends on 
the most persuasive integration of basic principles, placing the text within its wider constitutional 
context. The Justices deployed distinctions between law, fact, and public interest in rather different 
ways, reflecting their divergent interpretative approaches.  The role of constitutional convention is 
also of particular interest—central to the legal issues arising, on one view, but largely irrelevant on 
another.  At the root of these disagreements lie contrasting conceptions of law and adjudication. 
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We can sometimes learn a good deal about public law and legal interpretation by 
reflecting in some detail on a particular case, especially when the case is widely agreed to 
be one of constitutional importance.  Evans v Attorney General presents us with a division 
of opinion in the Supreme Court that reflects, at root, divergent attitudes to fundamental 
constitutional doctrine and—even further down—different understandings of the concept 
of law itself.1  Confronted by a statute that appeared to allow a government minister to 
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1   Evans v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] 2 W.L.R. 813. 
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veto a judicial decision of which he disapproved, the Justices were forced to consider the 
relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  Could the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 properly be construed as having such a surprising result, so 
antithetical to our usual assumptions about the proper relationship between the executive 
and the courts?  How should the tension between respect for the apparent will of 
Parliament, on the one hand, and adherence to the rule of law, on the other, be resolved? 
 Any coherent reconciliation of these basic doctrines, however, must itself draw on 
an underlying conception of law, repudiating rival approaches or assumptions.  From a 
perspective that emphasizes authoritative sources, distinguishing the content of law from 
moral or political principle, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty provides useful 
finality and certainty.  Constitutional principle or common law presumption quickly gives 
way to plain statutory instructions to a contrary effect; the legislative will is paramount 
even if it appears to do injustice in particular cases.  By contrast, those who put their faith 
chiefly in the rule of law, as a substantive constitutional doctrine, invoke a different 
account of the concept of law.  Authoritative sources are identified, interpreted and (when 
necessary) moderated on the basis of reasoned argument.  Moral deliberation comes to the 
fore as the defining characteristic of a system of law grounded on defensible principles of 
justice or fairness—principles that judges have a duty to develop and articulate in the 
course of adjudication.2 
 Evans illustrates these points to perfection.  Those Justices willing to take the 
statutory instructions at face value, swallowing their discomfort over such a dubious 
interference with the normal separation of powers, were also keen to insist on clear 
distinctions between law—and hence the judicial role—and moral or political judgment 
acceptably reserved for politicians.  A marked deference to statute, literally construed, was 
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accompanied by a parallel deference to ministerial discretion, which Parliament was free 
to bestow as it chose.  In contrast, those Justices unwilling to countenance a threat to 
principles of the rule of law—to the vision of law they sought to defend—were not only 
resistant to the claims of literal meaning.  They also looked askance at rigid doctrinal 
boundaries, supposedly marking out public law from moral or political principle, insisting 
that executive discretion be subjected to the discipline of reasoned argument and 
deliberation. 
 One prominent feature of the controversy concerned the relationship between law 
and convention.  The requirements of constitutional convention, as regards the 
relationship between ministers and the heir to the throne, were a significant thread in the 
arguments over the balance of public interests for and against disclosure of documents.  
While the judgments display some uncertainty about how the pertinent conventions 
should be classified—whether law, fact, or aspects of the public interest—the division of 
opinion over their role in the correct disposal of the case is very revealing.  The close 
interaction between law, convention, and public interest, implicit in the opinions of the 
majority of Justices, was denied by the dissentients, keen to stress the differences between 
these separate sources of legal and political authority.  Evans, accordingly, illustrates the 
deficiencies of any neat conceptual distinction between law and convention in the context 
of adjudication.  To presuppose that distinction is to beg important questions at issue.  
Dicey’s admonition that the “customs, practices, maxims, or precepts” that make up 
convention must not be considered law—they were neither enforced nor recognized by 
courts—cuts little ice in interpretative legal reasoning as distinct from descriptive political 
science.3    
                                                
3   A. V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution in J. W. F. Allison (ed.), Oxford 
Edition of Dicey (Oxford 2013), vol. I, 185.  If Dicey meant only that conventions were not recognized as legal 
rules (see Colin Munro, “Laws and Conventions Distinguished” (1975) 91 LQR 218, at 229 - 31) his 
descriptive categorization is largely irrelevant to adjudication, which may sometimes require moral or 
political judgment about the correct content and scope of such rules.   
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 From an internal, interpretative perspective—the viewpoint of the judge or lawyer 
deliberating about the content of the law—the requirements of constitutional convention 
may occupy a significant role.  Admittedly, a lawyer’s approach will always reflect his 
underlying jurisprudential commitments, whether explicit or merely implicit in his style of 
reasoning.  Adherence to a positivist conception of law may encourage the 
marginalization of convention, law being treated as the product of certain authoritative 
official sources that exclude the settled practices of politicians.4  From a more thorough-
going interpretative viewpoint, by contrast—an interpretative stance that resists the 
exclusive authority of a narrow range of official sources of law—political practice, 
exemplifying commitment to general principles of constitutional propriety, may provide a 
compelling guide to the requirements of constitutional law.5  Reliance on convention as a 
crucial determinant of a specific question of law, linked to assessments of the public 
interest, suggests a non-positivist, more open-ended conception of law: law is ultimately a 
reflection of political morality, the product of continuing, contextual deliberation about the 
requirements of justice and the public good.6 
 Evans, a Guardian journalist, sought disclosure of correspondence between the 
Prince of Wales, heir to the British throne, and various government ministers—the so-
                                                
4   A positivist conception of law treats law as fundamentally the product of authoritative sources, any 
overlap with moral or political principle being dependent on the law’s contingent content: official practice is 
determinative, rather than an interpreter’s appraisal of the moral implications of practice.  See generally 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1994).  Dicey treats conventions as a code of “constitutional 
or political ethics” as opposed to (positive) law: Lectures Introductory, previous note, 185. 
5   I have made this argument at length in Allan, Sovereignty of Law, ch. 2. 
 
6   Compare Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London 1986); but see also Allan, ‘Interpretation, Injustice, and 
Integrity’ (2015) O.J.L.S. 1, doi: 10. 1093/ojls/gqv014.  
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called “black-spider memos”—under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.7  In this 
correspondence Prince Charles had pressed his views about various matters of public 
policy; there was arguably a strong public interest in disclosure of the nature and extent of 
his influence on government decision-making.  The Information Commissioner upheld the 
Government’s refusal to disclose the documents on the ground that they were exempt 
from disclosure under provisions of the Act applicable to communications with the Royal 
Family and information held in confidence.8  Being qualified rather than absolute 
exemptions, the test was whether “in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest 
in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information” 
(section 2).  The Upper Tribunal, on appeal, conducted a full hearing, which included 
receipt of expert evidence on the constitutional conventions applicable to the status and 
responsibilities of the Prince of Wales.  The Tribunal ruled in favour of disclosure.  
However, the Attorney General invoked section 53 of the Act, allowing an “accountable 
person” (for present purposes, the Attorney) to give a certificate stating that he has “on 
reasonable grounds” formed the opinion that the statute permits non-disclosure.  The 
Divisional Court, on judicial review, upheld the certificate, but on appeal the Court of 
Appeal held it to be an unlawful exercise of the ministerial veto.  On further appeal the 
Supreme Court was divided, a majority upholding the Court of Appeal’s decision but 
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for environmental information under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, passed to give effect 
to Council Directive 2003/4/E.C., can for present purposes be ignored. 




STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
 
In the leading opinion, with which Lord Kerr and Lord Reed agreed, Lord Neuberger 
objected to the Attorney General’s exercise of his ministerial veto on fundamental 
constitutional grounds.  It was a basic principle of the rule of law that a judicial decision is 
binding on the parties and cannot be set aside by anyone, least of all by the executive.9  It 
was also fundamental to the rule of law that decisions and actions of the executive are 
normally reviewable by the court at the suit of an interested citizen.  Section 53, as 
interpreted by the Attorney General, flouted both principles: “It involves saying that a 
final decision of a court can be set aside by a member of the executive (normally the 
minister in charge of the very department against whom the decision has been given) 
because he does not agree with it.”10  Lord Neuberger noted that the Upper Tribunal is an 
independent court—both an expert tribunal and a superior court of record, “effectively 
with the same status as the High Court of Justice”.11  Invoking the “principle of legality” 
affirmed in previous cases, he applied the strong presumption that Parliament does not 
intend to legislate contrary to the rule of law.12  In providing, in subsection (4)(b), that the 
time for issuing a certificate (twenty days) was effectively to be extended where an appeal 
was brought against the Commissioner’s decision, the Act apparently extended the power 
                                                
9   Compare with Lord Judge C.J. in the Divisional Court [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin), [2014] Q.B. 855, at [12]: 
“It is fundamental to the constitutional separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and the rule 
of law itself that, although judicial decisions may be reversed by legislation (but very rarely with 
retrospective effect) ministers are bound by and cannot override judicial decisions: in our constitution that 
power is vested in Parliament.” 
10   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [52]. 
 
11   Ibid., at [16]. 
 
12   See e.g. R. v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p. Pierson [1998] A.C. 539, 575 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 
591 (Lord Steyn). 
 
 7 
to issue a certificate to a decision confirmed by a tribunal or an appellate court.  But that 
was “a very long way away indeed from making it ‘crystal clear’ that that power can be 
implemented so as to enable a member of the executive effectively to reverse, or overrule, 
a decision of a court or a judicial tribunal simply because he does not agree with it”.13 
 Lord Neuberger agreed that the correct interpretation of section 53 was that 
adopted by the Court of Appeal.  According to Lord Dyson M.R., a certificate could be 
lawfully issued only in the event of a “material change of circumstances” since the 
Tribunal’s decision or where that decision was “demonstrably flawed in fact or in law”.14  
While it would often, in practice, be open to the parties (as in this case) to rely on evidence 
or even exemptions that were not considered by the original decision-maker, when 
invoking the jurisdiction of the Commissioner or the First-tier Tribunal, it would be more 
difficult to do so on appeal to the Upper Tribunal or the Court of Appeal, which must be 
an appeal on a point of law.  There was also a real possibility, at least, that there could be 
matters arising that indicated serious flaws in a Tribunal determination but where no 
appeal lay—if it were a second appeal—because no important point of law or practice was 
raised.  Section 53 therefore retained a “potential function”, where a court or tribunal had 
held in favour of disclosure, even if it would be likely to arise “on few occasions and on 
limited grounds”.15 
                                                
13  Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [58].  Compare Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, at [159]: ‘The courts 
will . . . decline to hold that Parliament has interfered with fundamental rights unless it has made its 
intentions crystal clear’ (Lady Hale). 
14   Evans [2014] EWCA Civ. 254, [2014] Q.B. 855, at [38] (cited by Lord Neuberger at [71]).  This followed 
Simon Brown L.J.’s approach in R. v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p. Danaei [1998] I.N.L.R. 124 in 
relation to a ministerial decision that contradicted an earlier decision of the special adjudicator on the facts 
relevant to an asylum claim. 
15   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [78].  It was not impossible to envisage circumstances, accordingly, in which 
new grounds or evidence, relevant to issue of a certificate, might come to the attention of the accountable 
person, enabling him to act within the very limited twenty day period allowed (see [75]). 
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 In their dissenting opinions, Lord Hughes and Lord Wilson rejected this reading of 
the Act.  Lord Hughes objected that, while the statute could have stated the conditions for 
issue of a certificate identified by the Court of Appeal, it did not actually do so.  Although 
he agreed, in principle, that “Parliament will not be taken to have empowered a member 
of the executive to override a decision of a court unless it has made such an intention 
explicit”, he considered that Parliament had “plainly shown such an intention in the 
present instance”.16  Lord Wilson’s dissent was even more forthright.  In his view the 
Court of Appeal did not interpret section 53 at all: “It re-wrote it.”  Their decision invoked 
“precious constitutional principles” but “among the most precious is that of parliamentary 
sovereignty, emblematic of our democracy”.17  The result of the interpretation favoured by 
counsel for Evans was that it would “almost never” be reasonable for an accountable 
person to disagree with a court’s decision in favour of disclosure; and the trouble was that 
“Parliament made clear, by subsection (4)(b), that such a certificate could be given in such 
circumstances”.18  While Lord Wilson accepted that the possibility of challenge by way of 
appeal would affect the legality of any certificate, in the present case no such consideration 
arose.  Disagreement with the evaluation of public interests by the Upper Tribunal (under 
section 2(2)(b)) could not have amounted to a point of law on which the Government 
might have appealed to the Court of Appeal: “There was only one course open to it and 
then only if it had reasonable grounds for disagreement: it was to give a certificate under 
section 53.”19  Accordingly, the present circumstances “constituted a paradigm example of 
the area of the section’s lawful use”. 
                                                
16   Ibid., at [154]. 
 
17   Ibid., at [168]. 
 
18   Ibid., at [177].  Section 53(4) defines the “effective date”, for purposes of s 53(2), as the day on which (a) 
the decision notice is given to a public authority or (b) “an appeal under section 57 . . . is determined or 
withdrawn”. 
19   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [178]. 
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 Lord Mance, with whom Lady Hale agreed, adopted a position somewhere 
between the other majority judges and the dissentients.  On the one hand, he demurred at 
Lord Neuberger’s very narrow interpretation of section 53, granting the possibility that a 
certificate might lawfully express a minister’s disagreement with the balance of public 
interests as determined by a court or tribunal.  On the other hand, he denied that in the 
present case the Attorney General had given cogent reasons for such disagreement.  
Accordingly, Mance and Hale preserved the Upper Tribunal’s findings from 
governmental attack by sharply narrowing, in practice, the circumstances in which the 
minister could intervene.  While it would require “the clearest possible justification” 
before a certificate might validly override either judicial findings about the relevant 
background circumstances or rulings of law, disagreement about the relative weight to be 
attributed to competing public interests was permissible.  The evaluation of the respective 
public interests was a matter that a certificate could address “by properly explained and 
solid reasons”.20  In the present case, however, the Attorney General had not undertaken 
an appropriate weighing of interests: he had, on the contrary, undertaken “his own 
redetermination of the relevant background circumstances”.21  He had impermissibly 
challenged the constitutional position, encapsulated in constitutional convention, as 
explored and clarified by the Upper Tribunal. 
 Part of the court’s interpretative task lay in ascribing appropriate meaning to the 
ministerial power to issue a certificate on “reasonable grounds”.  Lord Hughes treated this 
requirement as one of simple rationality, apparently satisfied merely by observing that the 
Attorney’s view was shared by the Commissioner.  Lord Wilson conceded that the 
Attorney’s opinion would be reasonable only if, in his statement of reasons, he 
demonstrated engagement with the Tribunal’s determination; but he had done so (in 
Wilson’s view) by stating his disagreement with its approach to the evaluation of the rival 
                                                
20   Ibid., at [130]. 
 
21   Ibid., at [131]. 
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public interests.  Lord Neuberger, in contrast, insisted that the meaning of “reasonable 
grounds” was highly dependent on context, and it was not reasonable for an accountable 
person to issue a certificate simply because he took a different view from that “adopted by 
a court of record after a full public oral hearing”.22  Lord Mance thought that the Attorney 
General faced a “higher hurdle” than mere rationality, being required to give reasons that 
would withstand judicial scrutiny.  The requirement of reasonable grounds fell to be 
understood, therefore, in the light of each judge’s wider analysis of the nature and scope 
of the ministerial veto. 
 There are undeniable problems or disadvantages with each of the various 
interpretations defended.  Lord Neuberger’s interpretation might surprise a 
parliamentarian who had not reflected on the constitutional implications of a more literal 
reading.  Lord Mance shared Lord Wilson’s reluctance to ascribe a meaning to section 53 
that made it all but inapplicable in practice to decisions of the Upper Tribunal, noting the 
further complexities or incongruities that arose if the certificate could be more readily 
issued in the case of a decision by the Information Commissioner (from whom there 
would in any event be a right of appeal on both fact and law).  But Mance’s via media was 
itself precarious.  Neuberger observed that it was unrealistic to expect a minister to 
produce in twenty days an analysis capable of satisfying Mance’s high standards of 
justification, if indeed (he suggests) it were possible in practice to meet such standards at 
all.  And why, if the minister were entitled to overturn the Tribunal’s view about the 
public interests, should he not be able to disagree about the relevant facts? 
 The dissenting opinions avoid these problems; but they have to confront the 
objection that they sanction the unconstitutional overriding of a judicial decision by a 
member of the executive.  And it is no answer to say that the dissentients deferred to the 
will of Parliament unless we are confident that on the best construction—all things 
considered—their interpretation of the statute was correct.  Insofar, for example, as Lord 
                                                
22   Ibid., at [88]. 
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Hughes and Lord Wilson appeared to claim intrinsic superiority for an interpretation that 
invokes a standard, non-contextual sense of “reasonable grounds”, it was a spurious 
claim: a literal reading needs as much justification as a non-literal one.  If the dissentients 
were correct, it would only be because their reading made better sense of the Act overall, 
having regard to its general purposes and the wider constitutional context.23 
 If the Act is treated as a self-contained code, impervious to broader considerations 
of constitutional propriety, the dissenting opinions are perhaps the most persuasive.  But 
few common lawyers would contend that parliamentary sovereignty necessarily imposed 
such an approach.  The doctrine is widely and reasonably considered tolerable only 
because judges are expected to strive for harmony as far as possible between legislative 
instructions, as regards the immediate context, and constitutional principle, reflecting the 
background moral and political milieu usually taken for granted.  Everything depends, 
therefore, on the general theory of legal interpretation we favour: what is legally permitted 
or required reflects, at some level, what in our considered opinion it would be morally 
defensible to permit or require. 
 We should, then, be wary of Lord Hughes’s reliance on “the plain words of the 
statute”.24  It is true, as he observed, that section 53(2) could have expressly provided for 
the limitations on ministerial discretion stated by Lord Neuberger, but did not.  The issue 
is not, however, whether the bill’s promoters—Lord Hughes spoke simply of 
“Parliament”—would have been likely to include these limitations if they had been 
intended.  The legal issue is, instead, whether a court should read in such limitations on 
                                                
23   Lord Wilson was clearly entitled to emphasize the “unique array of safeguards” that operated to 
circumscribe a “unique” executive power.  In particular, the power applied only to a decision notice served 
on a government department and the accountable person had in England to be a Cabinet minister or the 
Attorney General, who by convention should consult the Cabinet collectively.  Moreover, a copy of the 
certificate was required to be laid before each House of Parliament, providing “the facility for almost 
immediate democratic scrutiny of the use of the override”.  See ibid. at {172}. 
24   Ibid., at [155]. 
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constitutional grounds.  If any suggestion of such limits made during parliamentary 
proceedings would have provoked “a decisive and negative response”, as Lord Hughes 
speculated, it might still be the case that those responding would have failed to appreciate 
the constitutional implications of their preferred construction. 
 In short, the truth of Lord Hughes’s assertion that “it is an integral part of the rule 
of law that courts should give effect to Parliamentary intention” hinges on the meaning we 
attribute to “Parliamentary intention”.  If it means the intention of the bill’s sponsors, or 
the draftsman, or even the hypothetical expectations of the typical member of Parliament 
voting in favour, then the assertion is very doubtful.  Since the “intention” of a collective 
body can only be constructed by reference to the language used, on one hand, and the 
apparent objectives of the statute, on the other, there is no escape from an interpretative 
engagement with constitutional principle.  We cannot ask for directives about how much 
weight to give to principle in making sense of the language employed; such directives 
would, in any event, present similar problems of construction.  We can sustain the rule of 
law only by reflecting for ourselves on what, in all the circumstances, is the most 
defensible interpretative conclusion.25 
   Whether Lord Wilson’s forthright criticism of the Court of Appeal is justified, 
then, depends on how the line between interpretation and “rewriting” should be drawn: 
the latter is only a pejorative label for an interpretation regarded as incorrect.  While a 
presumption in favour of ordinary meaning may produce a better match with the 
expectations of certain members of Parliament, or with those of other persons or officials, 
its force will depend on the context.26  The greater the threat to legal or constitutional 
principle, the more firmly should the courts insist on explicit statutory language—
                                                
25   See further Allan, Sovereignty of Law, ch 5.  Compare with Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 313 - 37. 
 
26   “Ordinary meaning” is intended to capture the idea of the “plain words” of the statute—literal meaning 
adapted as necessary to make sense of the immediate legislative instructions, disregarding broader matters 
of constitutional principle. 
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language which, by anticipating judicial construction, sensitive to principle, limits or 
excludes the preferred judicial response.  The court must be confident that the pertinent 
issues of principle have been addressed in a manner that any conscientious member of 
Parliament, attentive to the bill’s likely consequences, could reasonably have grasped.27  
And a grave enough threat will support a decisive rejection of ordinary meaning: no such 
conscientious parliamentarian can be supposed to have sanctioned radical breaches of the 
rule of law—violations of the kind that undermine legitimate governance. 
 If, moreover, parliamentary sovereignty is “emblematic of our democracy”, it is 
reasonable to suppose that its nature and scope, properly considered, express a defensible 
conception of democracy.  A defensible conception of democracy is arguably one that 
confers great power on a majority of elected representatives on the understanding—
reflected in suitable modes of judicial interpretation—that they should not interfere too 
greatly with basic features of the rule of law and separation of powers.  The conferral of 
powers on the executive to override an unfavourable judicial decision must be expected to 
attract suspicion.  The strong temptation to “maintain the supremacy of the astonishingly 
detailed” decision of the Upper Tribunal, to which the Court of Appeal in Lord Wilson’s 
view wrongly succumbed, was provoked by an appropriately strong desire to preserve 
the integrity of the rule of law.28  It does not follow, of course, that the narrow 
interpretation of section 53 preferred by the two highest courts was necessarily correct; but 
any presumption in favour of ordinary meaning was far too weak in these circumstances 
to do any interpretative work on its own. 
 Once it is conceded, moreover, that the existence of reasonable grounds must be 
determined in the context of the Tribunal’s decision, having regard to the Tribunal’s 
reasoned judgment, it is hard to make sense of that requirement in the absence of 
argument pointing to manifest error or change of circumstances.  A mere rejection of the 
                                                
27   Compare R. v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 131 (Lord Hoffmann), cited 
by Lord Neuberger in Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [56]. 
28   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [168]. 
 
 14 
Tribunal’s conclusions, even if explicit, hardly amounts to more than the assertion of a 
contrary opinion, unaffected by those conclusions.  Lord Judge, in the Administrative 
Court, held that “the principle of constitutionality requires the minister to address the 
decision of the Upper Tribunal . . . head on, and explain in clear and unequivocal terms 
the reasons why, notwithstanding the decision of the court, the executive override has 
been exercised on public interest grounds”.29  If, however, the minister is empowered 
merely to state his disagreement with the basis of the Tribunal’s conclusion, asserting a 
contrary view, it is hard to see how “close judicial scrutiny” can provide what Lord Judge 
considered was a “necessary safeguard for the constitutionality of the process”.30  Davis 
L.J., who thought that the situation called for “appropriately close scrutiny by the courts 
on a judicial review challenge”, agreed that the reasons given in a certificate must be 
“cogent”.31  But a cogent rejection of the Tribunal’s judgment would surely have to 
identify its faults and failings.  In the present case, as Lord Mance observed, the Attorney 
rode roughshod over the Tribunal’s detailed refutation of the principal elements of his 
position.  The illusory nature of the supposed judicial scrutiny is exposed by Davis L.J.’s 
robust dismissal of the claimant’s “underlying submission” that “the accountable person is 
not entitled simply to prefer his own view to that of the tribunal”.32  It was enough, in 
Davis’s view, that the Attorney’s reasons made “sense”, echoing those previously given by 
the Commissioner.33 
 Mark Elliott’s analysis of these issues is rather different.34  He considers that Lord 
Neuberger performed “radical interpretive surgery” on the statute: “Lord Neuberger’s 
                                                
29   Evans [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin), at [14]. 
 
30   Ibid. 
 
31   Ibid., at [89 – 90]. 
 
32   Ibid., at [111]. 
 
33   Ibid., at [113]. 
 
34   Mark Elliott, “A Tangled Constitutional Web: The Black-Spider Memos and the British Constitution’s 
Relational Architecture” [2015] P.L. 539. 
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construction is undeniably strangulated, the interpretations of the other Justices being 
obviously far less strained.”35  Elliott acknowledges that parliamentary sovereignty does 
not demand adherence to “the literal meaning of the words used by Parliament”; there is 
scope for judicial interpretation, applying “relevant constitutional principles”.  But 
parliamentary sovereignty is not, he contends, “infinitely elastic”, permitting any amount 
of “judicial violence to statutory provisions”.36  Elliott is worried that Neuberger’s 
treatment of section 53 may have crossed “the fine line that distinguishes bold statutory 
construction from judicial intransigence in the face of a constitutionally offensive statutory 
provision”.37  These concerns, however, imply that a literal reading enjoys an automatic 
priority, questions of legitimacy arising only when a more nuanced, non-literal reading is 
substituted.  But that view is open to challenge.  If we think that statutory interpretation 
should respect constitutional principle—reflecting the weight or importance of rule-of-law 
considerations—the outcome is neither strangulated nor strained: it is what the Act, 
correctly interpreted, means or requires. 
 Even if parliamentary sovereignty does not permit the courts to treat the statutory 
text as what Elliott calls “a blank canvas on which to project constitutional values”, it does 
not follow that an interpretation that departs significantly from literal meaning does 
“violence” to the text.  The “fine line” that Elliott fears Neuberger may have crossed can be 
located only from within an interpretation that gives due weight to all relevant principles: 
it is the product of competent legal interpretation, not an external constraint on 
interpretation, confining its scope from the outset.  The strength of Neuberger’s objections 
to a literal reading—if we accept their cogency—is all the justification needed.  There is no 
artificial stopping point before an interpretation is reached that does, in our considered 
opinion, satisfy all the pertinent dimensions of political morality.  The balance of general 
principles is key to the true meaning of the text.  Parliamentary sovereignty is arguably as 
                                                
35   Ibid., 548. 
 
36   Ibid. 
 
37   Ibid., 549. 
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elastic as is necessary to ensure that obedience to the legislative will is morally defensible, 
having regard to the consequences of alternative constructions.38  
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of an analysis of constitutional convention to a 
correct determination of the legal issues arising.  Even if on its face the Freedom of 
Information Act required only a balancing of interests for and against disclosure, making 
no mention of convention, the outcome necessarily reflected an understanding of the 
general constitutional context.  And established conventions concerning the relations 
between ministers and the monarch, on the one hand, and between ministers and the heir 
to the throne, on the other, formed a critical part of that context.  The relevant conventions 
must bear much of the weight of arrangements that seek to safeguard the position of the 
monarchy, insulating the Sovereign from the danger of entanglement in political 
controversy while permitting the freedom of speech necessary for the health of 
democracy.   The Upper Tribunal observed that “debate about the extent and nature of 
interaction between government and the royal family, and how the monarchy fits in to our 
constitution, goes to the heart of understanding the constitutional underpinning of our 
current system of government”.39  These were “important and weighty considerations in 
favour of disclosure”.  Respect for settled convention was an integral part of any serious 
appraisal of the case presented for non-disclosure; and, accordingly, adherence to the 
proper boundaries of convention was critical to the justification of an exemption from the 
ordinary demands of openness and freedom of speech.     
                                                
38   See further Allan, Sovereignty of Law, chs. 4, 5. 
 
39   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [142]. 
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 A number of key conventions were identified and distinguished.  The “cardinal 
convention” requires the monarch to act on ministerial advice, usually given by the Prime 
Minister on behalf of the Government.40  The “tripartite convention” refers to Walter 
Bagehot’s familiar account of the monarch’s “right to be consulted”, her “right to 
encourage”, and her “right to warn”.41  Exchanges between monarch and Prime Minister 
or between monarch and other ministers under the aegis of this convention remain 
confidential, the Sovereign being required to observe a strict political neutrality in public.  
The Upper Tribunal found “ample reason to justify the principle that the internal 
operation of these two conventions is not revealed, at least until after a long time has 
passed”.42  The “education convention” provided for the confidentiality of 
communications between ministers and the heir to the throne intended to instruct him in 
the business of government.  The Tribunal resisted as tendentious Professor Brazier’s 
labelling of it as the “apprenticeship convention”.43  The public nature of Prince Charles’s 
support for various policies and causes was inconsistent with the idea that similar 
advocacy, when pursued by private correspondence, was conducted as a form of rehearsal 
for his future role as Sovereign.44 
 In the familiar manner, faithful to Dicey’s strict dichotomy, the Upper Tribunal 
stressed that constitutional conventions were not law: “They are not enforced by courts.”45  
No one, for example, could seek to enforce in the courts the convention that an incumbent 
Prime Minister must resign if, after a general election, another party has won a majority in 
                                                
40   Ibid., at [76]. 
 
41   Ibid., at [77 – 88].  See Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (New York 1889), 143. 
 
42   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [87]. 
 
43   Professor Rodney Brazier gave evidence for the Government Departments (joined as additional parties), 
but his approach was regarded by the Tribunal as involving “a massive extension of the education 
convention” (para. 103); see further below. 
44   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [89 – 112]. 
 
45   Ibid., at [66]. 
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the House of Commons: “there is no law which says that such a Prime Minister must 
resign”.  In that rather literal sense of Dicey’s dichotomy, the Tribunal was plainly correct.  
It is not clear, however, that in the current circumstances such literalism was apposite.  A 
Prime Minister’s obduracy in the face of election defeat is rather unlikely to be pertinent to 
a cause of action in judicial proceedings.  In the present context, by contrast, law and 
convention were apparently entwined: the resolution of a question of law depended, at 
least to some degree, on the correct (or most persuasive) understanding of convention.  
The Tribunal sought to reconcile its engagement with convention with its view of the 
proper limits of its jurisdiction: 
 
The parties invite us to decide the extent of the constitutional convention.  It is only 
rarely that a court or tribunal has to decide a question of that kind, and it is a task 
which we undertake with circumspection.  We are not deciding an issue of law.46 
 
The parties’ invitation could hardly be refused, however, if the true extent of the education 
convention were a significant aspect of the balancing process required by statute.  The 
Tribunal’s conclusions may not provide a definitive account, binding on either ministers 
or the Prince of Wales as regards their future conduct.  But for the purposes of the current 
proceedings the scope of the convention was arguably no less a matter of law than any 
other constitutional consideration pertinent to the Tribunal’s conclusions.  It was a 
question of law in the sense that it was integral to an interpretation of the “unwritten” 
constitution, which provided the context in which the balancing exercise had to be 
undertaken.  If, as the Tribunal emphasized, “the major constitutional conventions are 
core elements in the United Kingdom’s parliamentary democracy”,47 they inevitably 
provided a major part of the normative landscape in which the statutory duties of 
                                                
46   Ibid., at [68]. 
 




disclosure fell to be defined and enforced.  The major conventions were an essential part of 
the interpretative context in which the relevant questions of law arose—a context that 
defined the scope of the plausible answers.48 
 If, of course, identifying the nature and extent of a constitutional convention 
involved only recording the views of the political actors, or ascertaining the majority view 
where opinion is divided, the court’s conclusions could be fairly categorized instead as a 
matter of fact.  The conventional requirements relevant to legal judgment would be part of 
the factual background but impose no evaluative obligation on judges.  When, however, 
the requirements of convention are controversial, the politicians divided about their 
content in particular instances, the court is inevitably drawn into the debate.  Even a 
majority view may be misguided in the sense that, on close scrutiny, it lacks a secure basis 
in established practice or rests on notions at odds with other important constitutional 
norms.49  The court must form its own view of the matter after studying the precedents 
and probing the reasons offered in support of competing accounts of the pertinent 
convention.  The Upper Tribunal’s acceptance of the “Jennings test” for the existence of a 
convention—and the broad scope contended for—underlines the point: 
 
As regards the scope of the education convention, we must apply the three elements of 
that test.  First, we must consider whether there is at least one precedent underpinning 
such a scope.  Second, we must consider whether both parties to it considered 
themselves to be bound to treat Prince Charles’s education in the business of 
government, with its special constitutional status and associated special degree of 
                                                
48   Even Dicey warned that “a lawyer cannot master even the legal side of the English constitution without 
paying some attention to the nature of those constitutional understandings which necessarily engross the 
attention of historians or of statesmen” (Lectures Introductory, above, 185). 
49   Compare with Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability 
(Oxford 1984), 10 - 12, distinguishing between “positive morality” and “critical morality”. 
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confidentiality, as extending not merely . . . to government informing Prince Charles 
about what it is doing and responding to queries from him.  Third, we must consider 
whether there is a reason, in the sense used by Jennings . . . for the convention to have 
that scope.50 
 
Sir Ivor Jennings had drawn a telling analogy between law and convention: 
 
As in the creation of law, the creation of a convention must be due to the reason of the 
thing because it accords with the prevailing political philosophy, it helps to make the 
democratic system operate, it enables the machinery of state to run more smoothly and, 
if it were not there, friction would result.51 
 
In addressing “the reason of the thing” the Tribunal had necessarily to make its own 
judgments about the merits of the competing conceptions of the education convention.  
The interpretative task—making the best possible sense of the precedents—was precisely 
analogous to its common law equivalent.  It was only by placing the relevant opinions and 
precedents within the larger constitutional framework—the complex tapestry of rights, 
responsibilities and expectations—that the judges could draw the correct (most plausible) 
conclusion.  The education convention was for all practical purposes law, providing the 
appropriate legal standard for judging between the respective claims. 
 The Upper Tribunal’s view of the nature and scope of the education convention was 
central to its decision in favour of disclosure.  By rejecting the Departments’ contention 
that the convention was wide enough to cover all correspondence between Government 
and the heir to the throne, the Tribunal set its face against any presumption of secrecy.  It 
                                                
50   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [75]. 
 




was noted that Professor Brazier’s evidence, supporting a broad conception of the 
education convention, apparently conflicted with his previous writings, which had 
suggested the recognition of a new and distinct convention, allowing the Prince of Wales 
to comment confidentially on ministers’ policies and urge adoption of alternative 
policies.52  The logical consequence of accepting Brazier’s extended view of the education 
convention would be that it covered both “advocacy correspondence” and also 
correspondence on charitable or social matters, even though in cross-examination he 
resiled from his stance in relation to charitable and social matters.  The evidence did not 
support the view that either Prince Charles or ministers regarded the advocacy 
correspondence as part of his preparation for kingship; it was acknowledged that his role 
as King would be quite different.  Nor was there good reason for the proposed extension 
of the convention: “It would be inconsistent with the tripartite convention to afford 
constitutional status to the communication by Prince Charles, rather than the Queen, of 
encouragement or warning which ministers might then take account of.”53 
 Although the Departments sought to rely on the importance of Charles’s 
preparation for kingship, even when such preparation fell outside the proper limits of the 
education convention, the Tribunal firmly rejected this as a general basis for non-
disclosure.  Any parallel between advocacy interchanges and the monarch’s interaction 
with Government by way of encouragement and warning was false.  While it was 
conceivable that communications might fall outside the education convention but 
nonetheless be properly regarded as an aspect of preparation for kingship—such as a 
discussion between Charles and the Prime Minister about future operation of the tripartite 
convention—they would not include the correspondence presently in issue: 
 
                                                
52   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [92 – 112].  See Rodney Brazier, “The Constitutional Position of the 
Prince of Wales” [1995] P.L. 401, 404 - 405. 
53   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [106]. 
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The “to and fro” between Prince Charles and government involved in advocacy 
communications may carry an incidental benefit of increasing Prince Charles’s 
knowledge of how government works, but unless there is some additional element they 
cannot properly be described as preparation for kingship.54   
 
The Tribunal’s analysis of the nature and scope of the education convention, therefore, 
played a central role in its appraisal of the respective public interests.  The convention 
gave shape and precision to a balancing exercise that might otherwise have lacked clarity 
and rigour. 
 The position is analogous to the Crossman Diaries case, where Widgery L.C.J. 
acknowledged the relevance of the convention of collective ministerial responsibility (and 
Cabinet confidentiality) to the balance of public interests.55  The Attorney General’s right 
to prevent publication of the former minister’s diaries, recording Cabinet discussions, 
depended on showing that protection of confidentiality, in accordance with convention, 
was important enough in all the circumstances to warrant the interference with freedom of 
speech.  He could not succeed unless he could establish both the content and importance 
of the convention—that the principle of Cabinet confidentiality could in principle justify a 
limitation of free speech—and further that the issue of an injunction was warranted on the 
facts, when the material in question was no longer relevant to current events.  The 
rationale and scope of constitutional convention were as critical to the court’s decision, 
therefore, as they were to a properly reasoned decision by the Upper Tribunal in Evans.  In 
both cases, a balanced and compelling judgment as regards the public interest depended, 




                                                
54   Ibid., at [174]. 
 
55   Attorney General v Jonathan Cape [1976] Q.B. 752; see further Allan, Sovereignty of Law, 65 - 67. 
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LAW, FACT, AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
It is in this context that the question arises as to whether the Attorney General could be 
thought to have had reasonable grounds for his view that the balance of public interests 
lay in favour of non-disclosure.  How far, if at all, was he permitted to dissent from the 
Tribunal’s view of the constitutional position, which denied any special constitutional 
status to the Prince’s advocacy correspondence?  Should the Tribunal’s view of the 
constitutional conventions be treated as authoritative—whether treated as conclusions of 
law or fact—and so binding on the Attorney in the absence at least of manifest error?  Or 
should the conventions be treated as merely one aspect of a broader question of public 
policy or public interest, on which the Attorney was entitled to disagree with the 
Tribunal? 
 In denying that the Attorney was merely adopting his own view of the public 
interest, Lord Mance elevated the constitutional conventions to the status of law or fact.  In 
his view, the certificate was based essentially on differences in the Attorney’s “account of 
the relevant circumstances, including the constitutional conventions, by reference to which 
the relevant issues of public interest fell to be evaluated”.56  In apparent disregard of the 
Tribunal’s detailed reasoning, the Attorney General had asserted his contrary view: 
 
Discussing matters of policy with Ministers, and urging views upon them, falls within 
the ambit of “advising” or “warning” about the Government’s actions.  It thus entails 
actions which would (if done by the Monarch) fall squarely within the tripartite 
convention.  I therefore respectfully disagree with the Tribunal’s conclusion that 
“advocacy correspondence” forms no part of The Prince of Wales’ preparations for 
kingship.57 
                                                
56   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [132]. 
 




Lord Mance, however, would permit the Attorney General to substitute his own view 
about the constitutional principles in play only if he could point to a specific flaw in the 
Tribunal’s reasoning: 
 
The certificate does not engage with, or begin to answer, the problems about this 
apparently wholesale acceptance of Professor Brazier’s thesis about the emergence of a 
new or highly expanded constitutional convention, which the Upper Tribunal had so 
forthrightly and on its face cogently rejected.  . . .   It does not address the fact that 
advocacy correspondence of the kind under discussion has no precedent, is not 
undertaken as part of and is not necessary as part of any preparation for kingship.58 
 
The extent of the education convention did not subsume all the relevant issues; there was 
apparently scope for the Attorney General to differ from the Tribunal even if he were 
clearly wrong about that issue.  As Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes were keen to 
emphasize, the Attorney’s view was that the advocacy correspondence served to 
familiarize Prince Charles with the practice of government, and so in that sense formed 
part of his preparation for kingship, whether or not such correspondence fell within the 
strict definition of the education convention.  If, however, the correspondents had not 
themselves regarded the exchanges as being in preparatory mode, and if it were conceded 
that, as King, Charles would conduct himself quite differently, the Attorney’s stance was 
decidedly weak.  Stripped from the context provided by the constitutional conventions, 
the whole notion of “preparation for kingship” was too vague to form a convincing basis 
for the Attorney’s view.  It was only in the most attenuated sense that the Prince’s 
advocacy correspondence could be claimed to serve the “very same underlying and 
                                                
58   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [137]. 
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important public interests which the education convention reflects”.59  The Attorney’s 
claim, moreover, that a lack of confidentiality, inhibiting the candid exchange of views, 
would damage the Prince of Wales’s “preparation for kingship” also rested on the dubious 
assertion that the correspondence served that purpose (as Lord Mance pointed out).60 
 There was a further issue about whether publication of the letters might endanger 
the Prince’s reputation for party-political neutrality.  In stressing this possibility the 
certificate again contradicted the clear findings of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal, as Mance 
observed, had robustly denied that public discourse left no space for public figures to 
express influential views without appearing politically partisan, or that “secrecy should, in 
effect, outweigh transparency for fear of ‘misperception’”.61 
 In treating all these matters as the “relevant background” to any appraisal of the 
public interest, Lord Mance substantially narrowed the Attorney’s discretion.  In 
substance, if not in so many words, Mance’s opinion amounts to an objection to the 
minister’s overriding the Tribunal on questions of law.  The “relevant circumstances” in 
which the respective public interests fell to be evaluated consisted in the correct 
understanding of constitutional norms.  As Lord Wilson observed, the certificate disclosed 
no disagreement with the Tribunal on any issue of fact “in any ordinary sense of that 
word”.62   These were matters of judgment in which issues of fact and assessments of risk 
were intermixed with questions of legal and constitutional principle.  The Tribunal’s 
reluctance to accede to any exaggerated assertions of risk to the Prince’s perceived 
neutrality was based on its commitment to the general principles of openness and freedom 
of speech.  It had pertinently observed that “the essence of our democracy is that criticism 
                                                
59   Attorney General’s certificate, para. 9 (quoted by Lord Wilson at [182]). 
 
60   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [138 – 139]; the claim was also “contrary to the clear and reasoned findings of 
the Upper Tribunal” (para. 139). 
61   Ibid., at [142]. 
 




within the law is the right of all, no matter how wrongheaded those on high may consider 
the criticism to be”.63 
 In Lord Mance’s view, it was not “open to the Attorney General to issue a certificate 
. . . on the basis of opposite or radically differing conclusions about the factual position 
and the constitutional conventions without, at the lowest, explaining why the tribunal was 
wrong to make the findings and proceed on the basis it did”.64  It was not permissible, we 
may fairly conclude, because the balancing process took place in the context of a scheme of 
constitutional principles, which should be correctly understood.  The fact that the relevant 
principles were partly embodied in conventions, reflecting settled political practice, could 
make no important difference.  Judicial exposition of the nature and scope of these 
conventions, grounded in an exploration of the underlying principles, made a significant 
contribution to constitutional law.  In substance, therefore—if by a more indirect and 
ambiguous route—Lord Mance followed Lord Neuberger in invoking the basic precept 
that a member of the executive cannot normally override a judicial decision, made on the 
basis of a full public hearing into interrelated questions of law, fact, and public interest. 
 Lord Wilson’s approach, by contrast, invokes a more rigid distinction between law 
and fact, on the one hand, and public policy or public interest, on the other.  In his view, 
the Attorney General disagreed with the Tribunal not on any question of fact or law but, 
instead, “in its approach to the evaluation of the rival public interests”.65  Insofar as the 
constitutional conventions are acknowledged as having any importance, they recede into 
                                                
63   Evans [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC), at [188] (quoted by Lord Mance at [141]).  In general, the Commissioner 
had not given sufficient weight to the public interest in disclosure: “Those who seek to influence 
government policy must understand that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing what they have 
been doing and what government has been doing in response, and thus being in a position to hold 
government to account.  That public interest is . . . a very strong one, and in relation to the activities of 
charities established or supported by Prince Charles it is particularly strong (para. 160).   
64   Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [145]. 
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the all-embracing category of public interests.  He thought there was “a surprising 
concentration in the evidence before the tribunal and in its judgment on the theoretical 
ambit of constitutional conventions”, especially the education convention: 
 
To determine whether a particular piece of correspondence fell within the ambit of the 
education convention or some other convention was not to determine the central 
question, which was whether the public interest in not disclosing it outweighed the 
public interest in disclosing it.66 
 
Since a disagreement about the evaluation of conflicting public interests could not 
constitute a point of law for the purpose of an appeal to the Court of Appeal, Wilson 
concluded that the issue of a certificate under section 53 was the Government’s only 
option.  The conclusion ultimately depends, however, on the resilience of the distinctions 
between law, fact, and public interest that Wilson largely takes for granted.  However we 
choose to classify constitutional convention, in particular, for the purposes of descriptive 
analysis, from an interpretative perspective these distinctions are more tenuous and 
context-dependent.  Their coherence depends on the substantive legal analysis in which 
they are deployed, as Mance’s judgment amply demonstrates.  It is only his willingness to 
submerge the issue of convention within the general category of public interest that 
enables Wilson to embrace the very doubtful notion of “preparation for kingship”. 
 It is interesting to compare the response of Davis L.J. in the Divisional Court to a 
submission (on behalf of Evans) that the matters considered by a court or tribunal were to 
be categorized as either law, fact, or mixed law and fact—all immune from interference by 
the executive in the absence of some special reason, such as the emergence of fresh 
evidence.  Denying that the Attorney General had purported to disagree with any findings 
of law or fact, Davis L.J. stressed that what was involved was “a value judgment as to 
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where the balance of the public interest lies”: it depended on “the weight to be accorded to 
the various competing factors”.67  There is an assumption here that beyond the strict limits 
of law and fact, narrowly defined, the Tribunal’s findings could be overturned without 
constitutional affront.  That preferred categorization, however, arguably begs the question 
in favour of the executive.68  Davis L.J. noted that “major questions arose in this case from 
the extent of, and application of, constitutional conventions—which (as the Upper 
Tribunal itself noted) are not matters of law, as such at all”.  They were not, as such, issues 
of law, however, only because the judge chose to draw the boundaries of public law 
narrowly: the relevant issues of public interest and those concerning “the applicability and 
extent of conventions” could, having regard to “their constitutional and political 
overtones”, be said to fall “within the domain of government ministers”.69   
 The Justices’ appraisal of the reasonableness of the Attorney General’s conclusions 
was necessarily rooted in these divergent understandings, resulting in conflicting 
judgments.  Lord Wilson accepted that “once the Upper Tribunal’s determination was 
disseminated, the Attorney General’s opinion would be reasonable only if, in his 
statement of reasons, he demonstrated engagement with its reasoning”.70  Such 
engagement need not penetrate, however, far beyond an assertion of his own conclusions: 
it was apparently enough that the Attorney had summarized the Tribunal’s conclusions 
and stated his disagreement as regards the overall balance of interests.  For Lord Hughes, 
it was enough that the Attorney had “explained in general terms where he differs and 
                                                
67   Evans [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin), at [108] (judge’s emphasis). 
 
68   Compare Lord Dyson M.R. in the Court of Appeal [2014] EWCA Civ. 254, at [38]: “The fact that a section 
53(2) certificate involves making an evaluative judgment (rather than a finding of primary fact) is not 
material to whether the accountable person has reasonable grounds for forming a different opinion from that 
of the tribunal.” 
69   Evans [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin), at [109]. 
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why, so that his reasoning can be understood”.71  Lord Mance, by contrast, required a 
much more detailed and cogent response to the Tribunal’s reasoning, identifying any 
flaws that could justify drawing different conclusions.  Whereas Wilson and Hughes 
showed great deference to the Attorney’s judgment, Mance demanded close adherence to 
the Tribunal’s reasoning in the absence of persuasive demonstration of error.  While law 
for the dissentients is largely equated with an authoritative source of executive power—the 
discretion conferred by section 53—law for Mance is assimilated, instead, to reasoned 
argument, drawing on legal principles and established constitutional practice. 
 What may appear on the surface to be rather technical arguments about how to 
draw necessary analytical distinctions or determine the appropriate standard of review 
turn out, on closer inspection, to be expressions of radically different legal philosophies.  
Although it is certainly possible to sever questions of public interest or policy from 
matters of legal principle or constitutional convention, in the manner of the dissenting 
opinions, the legitimacy of doing so—in the specific context of a ministerial act purporting 
to override a judicial determination of the same issues—is necessarily part of the legal 
argument.  While, for example, the marginalization of the education convention serves to 
make questions about “preparation for kingship” more open to non-expert opinion, it also 
weakens the legal protection afforded to freedom of information and freedom of speech.  
An insistence on the correct definition of the education convention—denying 
constitutional status to correspondence falling outside it—serves to undermine dubious 
assertions of immunity from ordinary duties of disclosure.  Deprived of the benefit of the 
convention, correctly ascertained, the case for non-disclosure of the Prince’s advocacy 





                                                




The significance of constitutional convention for the correct resolution of Evans depended, 
necessarily, on the correct interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.  If the 
Attorney General were free to make his own assessment of the competing public interests, 
regardless of the detailed analysis made by the Upper Tribunal, he could sidestep 
questions about the scope of the education convention as being of marginal concern.  He 
could fall back on assertions about preparation for kingship, ignoring the Tribunal’s 
considered and cogent objections.  If, however, the Attorney were instead required to 
address the findings of the Tribunal, giving good reasons for doubting their validity, his 
purported exercise of the veto under section 53 was very dubious.  The correct delineation 
of the education convention was a central pillar of the Tribunal’s determination; a 
conscientious attempt to engage with its findings would entail a convincing critique of its 
analysis, which the minister did not provide.  A persuasive account of constitutional 
convention was an integral part of the correct resolution of the balance of interests 
required by statute. 
 In the Supreme Court two sharply divergent approaches were defended.  Lord 
Neuberger extended the province of law, as finally articulated by the courts, to all the 
relevant findings of the Tribunal, including the balance of public interests.  Lord Hughes 
and Lord Wilson sought to erect a conceptual wall between matters of law and fact, 
narrowly defined, on the one hand, and those of constitutional convention and general 
public interest, on the other.  The dissentients’ apparent concession, however, that the 
Attorney should be required to address the Tribunal’s findings, rather than simply 
rejecting its decision, seems fatal to the coherence of their position.  Lord Mance, who took 
that requirement seriously, objecting to the Attorney’s cursory dismissal of the Tribunal’s 
meticulous analysis, left little scope in practice for legitimate disagreement—in the 
absence, at least, of exceptional circumstances of the kind acknowledged by Lord 
Neuberger. 
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 The commitment to articulate rationality—an insistence that rejection of the 
Tribunal’s findings should be based on rational grounds, properly explained—demolishes 
rigid distinctions between law, fact, and public interest.   Such distinctions prove too crude 
to accommodate the constitutional context, in which matters of legal principle demand 
sensitive application to the circumstances in view.72  How should the delineation of 
convention be categorized?  It cannot be simply a matter of fact: there is a normative 
dimension that demands interpretation of practice, dependent on reasons that the 
interpreter (in the last analysis) finds compelling.73  Nor can convention be properly 
classed as an aspect of public policy, subject to ministerial discretion as part of an overall 
political assessment of the needs of the moment.  It encapsulates political principle, 
serving when necessary to guide and constrain such overall assessment of more 
immediate interests.  If convention is not law in the sense that it can be judicially 
determined in a manner that is authoritative for all purposes, it is nevertheless pertinent to 
the content of the law when a court must assess competing public interests in resolving 
interrelated questions of public law and political practice.  In that limited sense, at least, it 
is law—the sense in which it is “recognized” as a legitimate guide to the correct resolution 
of a legal controversy.74 
                                                
72  For a comparable rejection of any clear-cut doctrinal distinction between law and fact in the context of 
error of law, acknowledging the distinction’s sensitivity to the demands of the particular statutory scheme, 
see Jones (by Caldwell) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19, [2013] 
2 A.C. 48: the division between law and fact must take account of policy considerations, including the 
relative competencies of the tribunal of fact and the appellate court or tribunal (paras. 41 - 47, Lord 
Carnwath). 
73   See further Allan, Sovereignty of Law, ch. 2. 
 
74   Joseph Jaconelli has rejected my earlier critique of the distinction between “recognition” and 
“enforcement” of conventions, defending instead a “clear conceptual divide between laws and conventions”: 
Jaconelli, “Do Constitutional Conventions Bind?” [2005] C.L.J. 149, at 153, 160 – 61.  I have not, however, 
argued (as Jaconelli appears to suppose) that a breach of convention, standing alone, “could furnish a free-
standing cause of action”.  See further Allan, Sovereignty of Law, 65 – 72. 
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 We must conclude that these conceptual distinctions were deployed in service of 
competing visions of public law. They were invoked by the dissentients in Evans to 
diminish the sphere of reasoned deliberation, as it pertained to the requirements of law, in 
order to preserve a larger field of political discretion for elected politicians.  Lord Wilson 
looked to Parliament to provide the necessary scrutiny of the ministerial veto.  However, 
we can only determine the correctness of his preferred division of powers between 
legislature and judiciary, in all the circumstances, by reflection on the wider constitutional 
context.  We must ensure that the “unique array of safeguards” provided by the Act are 
interpreted in a way that does, to the best of our ability, remove the threat we perceive to 
the rule of law.75  When the Attorney General is required by statute to satisfy himself of 
the legality of the non-disclosure of documents—not merely signal his view of the balance 
of public interests—it is somewhat anomalous if he is entitled, nonetheless, to substitute 
his own view for that of a superior court.76 
 The response that the Attorney was bound by the court’s view of the law, or even of 
both law and fact, but not by the court’s appraisal of the public interest, is not 
unproblematic, as several of the Justices appreciated.  It presupposes that these 
distinctions can be sustained in practice without undermining the court’s authority; and, 
as Lord Mance’s judgment shows, that was a very doubtful assumption.  The question of 
legality was closely bound up with an appraisal of the respective arguments for and 
against disclosure.  And central to these arguments were the nature and scope of the 
education convention, which could not—without prejudice to the integrity of the 
argument—be dismissed as inherently “political”, irrelevant to the legal issues arising.  
                                                
75   See Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [172]; see n. 23 above. 
 
76   As Laws L.J. observed, in discussing implicit conditions of Parliament’s sovereignty, the rule of law 
entails that “statute law has to be mediated by an authoritative judicial source, independent both of the 
legislature which made the statute, the executive government which (in the usual case) procured its making, 
and the public body by which the statute is administered”: R. (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2009] EWHC 3052 
(Admin), [2010] 2 W.L.R. 1012, at [36]. 
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When matters of public interest are remitted to courts or tribunals, charged to reconcile 
competing rights or freedoms, the erection of artificial doctrinal barriers to judicial review 
endangers the rule of law.  It disrupts the full elaboration of reasoned argument that is, in 
the final analysis, the lifeblood of the ideal of due process of law.77 
 That ideal of the rule of law as the rule of reason—an insistence on rigorous 
analysis of all relevant questions, imposing onerous constraints of coherence and 
consistency—was implicit in the majority judgments in Evans.  Legal judgment is moral 
judgment in which we seek the correct (or most defensible) answer, having regard to the 
most plausible and compelling interpretation of the relevant legal materials.  There is no 
short cut available that rests on anyone’s personal authority or preference.  Admittedly, 
we do not suppose that there is a correct legal answer to every matter remitted to the 
discretion of a public authority; we grant such discretion to enable public policy to be 
developed as executive officials see fit.  But submission of a question to the jurisdiction of 
a court invokes the accompanying constraints of the rule of law: we should normally 
accept the result as the legitimate outcome of an open, impartial process for resolving a 
specific dispute.78 
                                                
77  I have suggested that the Canadian Supreme Court mistakenly erected Dicey’s descriptive categorization 
of rules into legal doctrine in Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos 1, 2, & 3) (1982) 125 
D.L.R. (3d) 1, overlooking the essential role of convention in protecting Canadian federalism from 
subversion by the manipulation of legal formalities: Allan, Sovereignty of Law, 58 - 59, 69 - 72.   Transfixed by 
Dicey’s law-convention dichotomy, the Court ignored the implications of its own acknowledgement that the 
“main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal framework of the Constitution will be 
operated in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or principles of the period” (Reference re 
Amendment, above, 84). 
78   Lord Mance observed that “the Upper Tribunal heard evidence, called and cross-examined in public, as 
well as submissions on both sides.  In contrast, the Attorney General . . . did not.  He consulted in private, 
took into account the views of Cabinet, former Ministers and the Information Commissioner and formed his 
own view without inter partes representations”: see Evans [2015] UKSC 21, at [130]; compare Lord 
Neuberger, ibid., at [69]. 
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 Admittedly, the ideal of the rule of law is itself a contested one.  Any conclusions 
about the correct judicial approach in Evans connect, as I have suggested, to 
jurisprudential views about the nature of law and adjudication.  In turn, debates within 
legal philosophy may reflect divergent conceptions of legitimate governance—even if 
conceptual argument sometimes obscures these underlying differences or purports to be 
indifferent to them.  The link between legality and legitimacy, however conceived, forms 
an implicit component of any legal conclusion or judgment. As Ronald Dworkin observes, 
emphasizing the connection between legal argument and legal philosophy: 
“Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at 
law.”79 
 A contrasting conception of law, built on a rival account of the rule of law, 
emphasizes legal certainty, celebrating the simplicity and clarity achieved by curtailing the 
interpretative process.  Closer adherence to the plain or ordinary meaning of statutes—
diminishing the role of constitutional principle—attempts to restrict moral debate and 
deliberation to marginal cases, discouraging disagreement about more central or standard 
cases.80  Doctrinal distinctions, separating the sphere of law, narrowly conceived, from 
politics or political morality, may serve to limit the judicial role in ways that some readers 
might prefer.  Legal certainty may be enhanced, for example, by adherence to strict 
interpretative divisions between statute, common law, and convention, even if that means 
that politicians are freer to manipulate legal forms to achieve ends of questionable 
propriety. The graver the threat to other constitutional values, however, the less plausible 
the case for giving priority to legal certainty becomes; and the stronger the challenge to the 
                                                
79   Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 90. 
 
80   Compare Dworkin’s account of “conventionalism” as a conception of law that reflects an ideal of 
protected expectations: “Past political decisions justify coercion because, and therefore only when, they give 
fair warning by making the occasions of coercion depend on plain facts available to all rather than on fresh 
judgments of political morality, which different judges might make differently” (ibid, 117). 
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judicial role as defined by the customary separation of powers, the greater the strain 
placed on doctrinal distinctions that may serve well enough in other contexts. 
 At any rate, doctrinal distinctions, circumscribing judicial assessments of political 
principle or the public good, are always in need of justification.  They do not reflect 
features of the world that exist independently of our morally engaged, interpretative 
efforts to make normative sense of own institutional arrangements.  Decisions like Evans 
show us how superficially trivial differences of judicial opinion, focused on the special 
features of a single case in all their complex particularity, are often the product, further 
down, of deeper, more philosophical disagreement about the nature and functions of law.  
The doctrinal distinctions and methodological assumptions invoked reflect divergent 
conceptions of legitimate government—what justifies the exercise of judicial authority in 
ways that politicians or their officials may sometimes find highly inconvenient.  Our legal 
conclusions, then, are only as good as the jurisprudential foundations on which they are 
necessarily erected. 
